161 natural increase in the Ukrainian parts of the Soviet Union. The USSR not having issued any statistics. It seems, however, that population was reduced by increased mortality.

161 The steady flow of emigration diminished the actual in-
166 crease of the Ukrainian people. West Ukrainians go to the United States and Canada, the inhabitants of the Dnipro area to the Caucasus and Asia. Movements within the frontiers shift the population slowly to the east and south, these movements being strongest towards the Basin of the Donets and the North Caucasus, and weakest towards the areas on the right banks of the Dnipro and Galicia. There is also a steady flight from the country to the town. In consequence to an increase of the collective system, of famine and flight to the town, the population of the USSR did not grow since 1932; increase of population in the towns was opposed by considerable decrease in the country.

c) National Conditions

182 National conditions in the Ukrainian territory at present have been produced by long and complicated processes which Ukraine was forced to undergo by factors such as her geographical position, the extent of her territory, movements of colonisation, natural increase, migration, lack of an independent government, etc.

In consequence, the national composition of Ukrainian areas is characterised by peculiar features, such as a mixture of nationalities in many provinces, a fairly high percentage of national minorities, a considerable difference from the ethnological point of view between the populations of town and village, and so on.

167 We find different national conditions in the different frontier districts. In the West, the Ukrainian factor receded; the frontier between Ukraine and Poland was regulated in favor of the latter and, what was more important, the entire region of the frontier was settled by Poles who had been pressing east from time immemorial, in the search for better opportunities for their surplus population. The Polish immigration in these districts is

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

● 166 ALREADY IN THE EIGHTIES SYMPTOMS OF OVER-POPULATION WERE NOTICEABLE in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. The peasants continued to move on into New Russia, but by this time that region was itself becoming fairly thickly populated. Migrants pursued their way to the newer lands in the northern Caucasus and beyond the Volga. From 1890 onwards the Government took a hand in the organization of this migratory movement. According to the Emigration Department, set up at this period, the greatest number of migrants over the whole Empire came from the 'rich black earth regions' of Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk and Kharkov. However, between the years 1907 and 1913, the Poltava and Chernigov Governments, from being first and second in this respect, ranked only third and fifth. This fact is explained by the initiative of important landowners and industrialists like Kharitonenko, Tereshchenko and others who built up the sugar-beet industry on a large scale. Notwithstanding this factor, between 1906 and 1914, according to the statistics of the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 1,610,000 peasants migrated from the Ukrainian Governments, while migration was also taking place from different districts of New Russia. The Ukrainians mostly went to settle the steppe area in western Siberia and the region of Orenburg; others reached the Amur and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Ukrainian settlements came to be known as the Green Wedge (*Zelëny Klin*) and where the names of the wealthy villages of Novo-Kievskoe, Poltavskoe and Chernigovskoe piously recalled the origin of those who had come from the banks of the Dniepr and the Seym.

311 433 At the beginning of the twentieth century the classical 'three-field system', already prescribed as a law in the Lithuanian Statute of the sixteenth century, prevailed in left-bank Ukraine. This system answered the requirements of the small landowner or well-to-do peasant who farmed 20 to 100 hectares. Few troubled to produce more than a small surplus, the sale of which might cover their current wants. Horticulture, apiculture and some stock-raising served to supplement income. On the larger estates all the energies of the owners were directed to the lucrative exploitation of the sugar-beet industry. Stretches of land were bought or leased from peasants or small landowners in order to increase the acreage under beet. The rapid development and excellent management of the sugar-beet industry impressed and disturbed the German Commission of Professor Auhagen in 1912. By this time the industry had assumed a certain international importance. In 1914 433 there were over 190 sugar factories in the Ukraine out of 226 for the 244 whole Empire (the bulk of the balance was produced in Poland). As against 2 million hectares under wheat in the Ukraine (excluding

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It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Donets rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population.

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to be still too strong

Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture

In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

Clover and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

Sunflower-seed is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

Tobacco, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine

Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

Bauxites in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

●166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.[1] Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[1] [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166 ●
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
•166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

1 [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

● [166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 626 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

The Russian Danube Steam Navigation Co. traded from Odessa to Danube river ports. It had a fleet of eleven vessels, with a tonnage of 9,000. 505

The following foreign lines had regular sailings to Odessa: Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co., thrice weekly, from Hull; J. R. Ellerman, Ltd., fortnightly, from Liverpool; James Moss & Co., every four weeks, from Liverpool; the Messageries Maritimes, fortnightly, from Marseilles; and the Deutsche Levante Linie, monthly, from Genoa.

Tramp steamers of many nationalities are attracted in great numbers to Ukraine ports in the autumn for the shipment of the cereal crop, and there is seldom any lack of cargo space.

The foreign lines with regular services appear capable of meeting the normal demand on their cargo space. The Russian lines require Government support, as shipping under the Russian flag is not as a rule commercially successful.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication*

Telegraphic communication with foreign countries is dependent mainly on cable lines not situated in the Ukraine, which has only one cable, from Odessa to Constantinople, the joint property of the Indo-European Telegraph Co. and the Eastern Telegraph Co. Telegrams for the East are sent *via* the Kertch station of the Indo-European Telegraph Co.; those for northern Europe or America, *via* Petrograd and thence by various cable lines. 206

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration* 464

The line of cleavage between agricultural and other labour is not so sharp in the Ukraine as in most other communities. The claims of agriculture are the greater by far, but the increase in the number of landless peasants who find it difficult to live in the country 166

464 districts through the long winter has led to the creation of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 221 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful, but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 511 565 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any branch of industry. The State makes no effort to regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid work in the towns, and both men and women have often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-